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Fiorentino: America Online, Inc. v. AT&T Corp. 243 F.3d 812 (4th Cir. 2001)

AMERICA ONLINE, INC. V. AT&T CORP.
243 F.3d 812 (4 Cir. 2001)
I.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff-Appellant, Internet service provider (ISP) America
Online (hereinafter "AOL"), filed suit against competing ISP,
AT&T Corporation (hereinafter "AT&T) for trademark
infingement in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia which granted summary judgment to AT&T on
all claims.' AOL appealed and the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit affimned the decision in part, vacated in part
and remanded. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the part of the district
court's decision that (1) AOL's use of the phrase "You Have Mail"
was generic and not enforceable, and (2) that AOL's use of the
initials "IM" to denote its instant messaging service was not
enforceable as a trademark.2 The Fourth Circuit, however, ruled
that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether AOL's
use of "Buddy List" constituted a valid service mark.3 The
appellate court reversed part of district court's decision that
granted summary judgment to AT&T on AOL's claim of
and remanded for
infingement of the "Buddy List" trademark
4
proceedings consistent with this decision.
II.BACKGROUND
Founded in 1985, AOL is now the world's largest Internet
service provider with over 18 million members. 5 Provided with
membership are several features and services. Among these are
the ability to "send and receive electronic mail" ("e-mail") and the

1America Online, Inc. v. AT&T Corp., 243 F.3d 812, 814 (4th Cir. 2001).

2Id.

3id.
4id.
5 America Online, 243 F.3d at 815.
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ability to "establish real time communication ("chat") through
'instant messaging."' 6 In connection with its chat service, AOL7
uses "Buddy List" and "IM" to describe features of the service.
The "Buddy List" allows users to list the screenames of other AOL
members in a window at the top right comer of their computer
screen. When one of the other members on the user's list logs
onto the service, their screenname will appear in the "Buddy List"
window and the member will be alerted that this particular
member has logged on. "If a 'Buddy' is identified as online, the
subscriber may then click a button labeled 'IM,' to instant message
the member, and initiate a real-time chat session with the
subscriber identified in the 'Buddy List.' 8 AOL has used the
terms "Buddy List" and "IM" since at least 1997 and has promoted
the terms extensively.9 In June of 1998, AOL obtained a
certificate of registration from the Patent and Trademark Office
("PTO") indicating that the "Buddy List" mark had been registered
on the Principal Register and that AOL had used the mark as a
service since August 31, 1995.10 Also, AOL alerts its member at
sign-on that they have e-mail waiting for them by displaying the
words "You Have Mail" and playing a recording that announces,
'You've got mail."'" AOL contends it has used these marks
2
extensively and that it now has a proprietary interest in them.'
AT&T, a competing ISP, uses similar marks to those of AOL. It
uses the terms "Buddy List," "You Have Mail," and "IM."' 13 In
December of 1998, AOL commenced this action, seeking
preliminary and permanent injunctive relief against AT&T to4
prohibit it from using marks similar to those asserted by AOL.'
AOL asserted that AT&T's use of similar marks was a violation of
6 id.

71d.
8Id.

9AOL's advertisements in the years since 1997 have focused on the "Buddy
List" and "IMing" features.
10 America Online, 243 F.3d at 815.
1"America Online, 243 F.3d at 815.
12 id.
13 id.

14 id.
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the Trademark Dilution Act provisions of the Lanham Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1125(c) and infinges AOL's marks in violation of 15
U.S.C. § 1114.15 In response, AT&T contended that the marks
were "common, generic terms for e-mail, instant messaging,
communication and related services."' 6 AT&T also filed a
counterclaim seeking a declaratory judgment that AOL's marks
are not valid trademarks and requested an order directing that the
PTO cancel registration for "Buddy List."'17 The district court
denied preliminary and injunctive relief and granted summary
judgment to AT&T because all three marks were generic, and were
therefore, unable to exist as trademarks. 18 Furthermore, the court
ordered that the PTO cancel the registration of the "Buddy List"
mark.
Im.LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Issues
On appeal, the court considered (1) did the district court have an
obligation to afford deference to the PTO's decision to certify
"Buddy List" as AOL's service mark; (2) was there a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether AT&T's use of "Buddy List"
constituted a valid service mark; (3) was AOL's use of the phrase
"you have mail" generic and not enforceable as a trademark; and
(4) whether AOL's use of the initials "TM" to denote its instant
messaging service was enforceable as a trademark. 19 Because the
first two issues were so closely related and discussed in the court's
ruling, they shall be discussed together here as well.

15America Online, 243 F.3d at 815.
16id.
17id.

18
19 Id.

Id.at 816.
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1. Whether the DistrictCourt Was Required to Give Deference to
the PTO
AOL's primary argument for the validity of the "Buddy List"
mark as a suggestive mark was that the PTO had registered
'Buddy List" as a valid trademark and therefore the district court
was bound to accept the mark as such.20 AOL argued that the
PTO's ruling is undertaken with special expertise within the scope
of its delegated authority under the Lanham Act and as such its
determination is entitled to substantial deference.21
AOL relied heavily on an earlier United States Supreme Court
case in making this assertion; Chevron v. U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council,Inc.22 Chevron deference is a tool of
statutory construction whereby courts are instructed to defer to the
interpretations of expert agencies. .. "23 Specifically, Chevron
directs that a court, when reviewing an agency's interpretation of a
statute, must use a two-step process. 24 First, the court must
determine "whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue." 25 Only if the statutory language is silent or
ambiguous to the question posed shall the court proceed to the
second step. 26 The second step is to determine "whether the
agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the
statute.2 7 "Thus, Chevron deference would only apply to an expert
agency's interpretation of statutory language. The Fourth Circuit
did not agree that Chevron was controlling of the case at hand and
distinguished it as such.
The court ruled that if AOL had asked the court to defer to the
PTO's interpretation of statutory language of the Lanham Act, or
to defer to a PTO regulation that arguably controlled the outcome
20

America Online, 243 F.3d at 816.

21

Id.

22 Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. NaturalResources Defense Council,Inc, 467 U.S.

837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984).
America Online, 243 F.3d at 817.
24 Id. at 842
2Id.
26
America Online, 243 F.3d at 815.
27 id.
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of the case, then Chevron might have been applicable. However,
the court ruled that Chevron was inapplicable to the case at hand
because AOL was arguing for deference to what amounted to a
"quasi-ad judicatory decision" of the PTO; that "Buddy List" is a
suggestive trademark, entitling it to protection under the Lanham
Act. 28 The court concluded that this type of agency decision did
not involve statutory interpretation by the agency and was not
subject to Chevron deference. The court ruled that Congress
clearly expressed intent in the Lanham Act to place PTO decisions
under the supervision of the federal courts as it declared that "such
judicial orders shall be certified by the court to the Commissioner
who shall make appropriate entry upon the records of the Patent
and Trademark Office, and shall be controlled thereby.29 The
court went on to reason that Congress clearly expressed in the
Lanham Act that the federal courts are to be the final arbiters of
trademark disputes. The court quoted language from 15 U.S.C. §
1119 stating that "Congress expressly vested in the federal courts
the power to 'determine the right to registration, order the
cancellation of registrations ...restore canceled registrations, and
otherwise rectify the register with respect to the registrations of
any party to the action." 30 In addition, the court pointed to the fact
that Congress clearly stated the limited deference that PTO
certification provides. PTO certification only confirms that the
mark in question has been registered with the PTO and no more.
The court concluded that in deciding whether "Buddy List" was
generic, the district court had no obligation to give Chevron
deference to the decision of the PTO. 3 1 Rather, it was only
required to receive the certification of registration of the mark into
evidence as prima facie evidence of the validity of the mark and as
prima facie evidence that the "Buddy List" mark was suggestive.

28

id.

29

Ameica Online, 243 F.3d at 815.
Id.at 817.
31
d.at 818.
30
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2. Whether There Was a Genuine Issue of MaterialFactas to
Whether AT&T's Use of "Buddy List" Constituted a Valid Service
Mark
The court ruled that, "while the district court did act
appropriately in receiving the certificate of registration of "Buddy
List" as prima facie evidence that the mark was suggestive, it
thereafter erred in ignoring that evidence." 32 The question at hand
was whether the prima facie evidence provided by the certificate
of registration, and additional evidence introduced by AOL that
"Buddy List" has been treated in a suggestive manner, was
sufficient to establish a question of material fact that could not be
resolved on summary judgment.33 The district court looked at this
evidence and found it insignificant and determined that a
reasonable jury could only conclude that "Buddy List" was
generic. 34 The appellate court ruled that by weighing the evidence
itself, the district court violated a basic principle of Rule 56
jurisprudence; that in determining whether a genuine issue of
material fact exists, a court must view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party. 35 Here, the evidence
should have been weighed in the light most favorable to AOL.
The district court, however, failed to do this. The Fourth Circuit
concluded that in the light most favorable to AOL, considering the
prima facie evidence of the PTO certification and other evidence
introduced by AOL, there was sufficient evidence to establish a
question of material fact that could not be resolved on summary
judgment. The question of material fact was whether AOL's use
of "Buddy List" constituted a valid service mark. The Fourth
Circuit vacated the district court's ruling on "Buddy List,"
including its order directing the commissioner to cancel the
32

America Online, 243 F.3d at 818.

33 id.
34

3

id.

1Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56.
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36
certificate of registration and remanded for further proceeding.

3. Whether AOL's Use of the Phrase "You Have Mail" was
Generic andNot Enforceable as a Trademark
The district court concluded that the alleged mark "You Have
Mail" functions primarily to inform AOL subscribers that they
have e-mail waiting for them.37 The court concluded that when a
common word or phrase is used as a mark for its ordinary
meaning, the mark is generic and cannot be enforced as a
trademark.38 The district court further concluded that the "You
Have Mail" mark was used in a functional manner-the words
described something within their normal function and use.3 9 This
functional manner in which AOL uses "You Have Mail" is
consistent with a public perception of the phrase as describing
whether mail is in an electronic mailbox, rather than as describing
a service associated with AOL.40 AOL's use of the phrase is
conditioned on whether mail is present and does not describe any
service provided. Rather, the mark acts only to alert members to
the fact that they have mail awaiting them. The court reasoned
that this type of use simply employs common words to express
fact that they have
their ordinarily used meaning, of the ordinary
41
mailboxes.
their
new electronic mail in
Furthermore, AOL had not registered "You Have Mail" as a
trademark with the PTO. 42 Therefore, "AOL must carry the
burden of establishing the validity and its ownership of the mark as
part of its larger burden in a trademark action.' 43 The burden is on
AOL to prove that it has a valid, protectable trademark and that the
defendant is infringing its mark by creating confusion or likelihood
36
37
38

America Online, 243 F.3d at 818.
America Online, 243 F.3d at 818.

rd.

39 1d.
40 m.
41
42

Id. at 820.
Ameica Online, 243 F.3d at 819.

431d.
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thereof, by causing mistake, or by deceiving as to the attributes of
its mark.44 In order to succeed in their claim that "You Have
Mail" is not a generic mark, AOL would have to claim the mark
goes beyond simply alerting members that they have mail and is
connected to or in some way promotes one of the services AOL
offers. "Indeed AOL itself has made no claim that "You Have
Mail" has been used to indicate anything but the information that
the subscriber has mail. The Fourth Circuit, agreeing with the
district court, ruled that when words are used in a context that
suggests only their common meaning they are generic and may not
be appropriated as exclusive property.45 The court contrasted the
situation at hand to another set of facts. "At the basic level we can
conclude that when a fruit merchant sells fruit as "apples" he
should never be able to exclude competitors from similarly using
the word "apple" to sell fruit. But if the common word apple is
used by a computer merchant in selling computers, we conclude
that the usage, not the word, is so uncommon, and therefore
"distinctive" that the computer merchant should be able to exclude
46
other competitors from using "apple" in the sale of computers.
AOL advanced no evidence that it uses "You Have Mail" in any
distinctive manner. The Fourth Circuit concluded that as a matter
of law, AOL's usage of the would-be mark falls within the
heartland of common meaning and usage and therefore AOL may
not exclude others from using the same words in connection with
their e-mail service.47 This is due to the fact that AOL uses the
phrase "You Have Mail" functionally-consistently (to tell
subscribers they have mail) and that other in the industry use the
same or similar phrases for the same purpose. Consequently, the
court affinmed the part of the district court's decision ruling that
AOL's use of the phrase "You Have Mail" was generic and not
enforceable as a trademark.
4. Whether AOL 's Use of the Initials "IM" to Denote Its Instant
44 Id. at 819.
45 America Online, 243 F.3d at 820.
46 Id. at 820.
47 id.
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MessagingService Was Not EnforceableAs a Trademark
For several reasons, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district
courts rulings denying enforcement of "ITM" as trademarks of
AOL.48 AOL argued that the district court erred in refusing to
enforce "'M" as a trademark for the "instant messaging" service
because the mark was generic. 49 The district court, however, gave
several reasons in support of the finding that the mark was generic:
(1) AOL employees used "IM" as a noun and/or verb; (2) books,
dictionaries and glossaries define "instant messaging" with IM as
an abbreviation; and (3) AOL does not claim any proprietary
interest in the phrase "instant messaging." 5° AOL further asserted
that because it was the first company to use the abbreviation "IM"
in such a manner, the court should conclude that "TM" referred to
the source (AOL) and not just the feature. 51 The court disagreed
with this contention, pointing out that AOL only contended in a
conclusory manner that "IM" is a trademark rather than simply the
product at issue. 52 AOL based much of its claim to the purported
"IM" mark on the fact that the media has frequently used "IM" in
association with AOL and that no other ISP calls their real-time
chat service "TM.",53 Although the Fourth Circuit looked at these
reasons, the court was not willing to determine that "TM" was
generic. However, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's
decision denying trademark protection to "TM" based on the
district court record.54
IV. CONCLUSION

The court concluded that the validity of "Buddy List" could not
be resolved on summary judgment because a genuine issue of
48

America Online, 243 F.3d. at 823.

49 id.

50 Id.
51

Id.

-2 America

Online, 243 F.3d at 823.

53 id.
54 id.
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material fact existed. Accordingly, the court vacated the portion of
the lower courts decision finding "Buddy List" generic as well as
the order directing cancellation of the registration of the mark with
the PTO. The court further ruled that federal courts are not
required to give deference to the PTO's decision to a service mark,
but rather the PTO is operated under the supervision of the federal
courts, which are the final arbiters on trademark and copyright
issues under the Lanham Act. Finally, with respect to the district
court's rulings denying enforcement of "You Have Mail" and
"IM" as trademarks of AOL, the court affirmed.
MichaelFiorentino

https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol11/iss2/12

10

